主题:Optimal Discrimination-free Auction
主讲人:陈博(深圳北理莫斯科大学)
主持人:杨仁琨(BETVLCTOR伟德官网下载)
会议时间:2022年10月10日(周一)下午14:30-16:00
会议地点:伟德BETVlCTOR1946102室(线下)
腾讯会议:ID:674-507-530 密码:221010 (线上)
摘要
This paper introduces a second-price auction with a flexible reserve price, where the reserve price for the top bidder is not fixed but a function of all losing bids. We show that when bidders are ex ante heterogeneous, a second-price auction with an optimally chosen flexible reserve price not only generates a strictly higher expected revenue than that of a second-price auction with any fixed reserve price but is also revenue-maximizing among all strategy-proof and discrimination-free mechanisms.
主讲人简介
陈博,深圳北理莫斯科大学经济系副教授,毕业于德国波恩大学。研究领域为产业组织理论,机制设计与信息经济学。论文发表于RAND Journal of Economics,Journal of Mathematical Economics等国际权威期刊。