伟德BETVlCTOR1946学术系列活动之经济学系列 Seminar 第258期:陈博(深圳北理莫斯科大学)

发布者:彭毅发布时间:2022-09-30浏览次数:183

主题:Optimal Discrimination-free Auction

主讲陈博(深圳北理莫斯科大学)

主持人:杨仁琨(BETVLCTOR伟德官网下载)

会议时间:20221010日(周一)下午14:30-16:00

会议地点:伟德BETVlCTOR1946102室(线下)

腾讯会议:ID674-507-530 密码:221010 (线上


摘要

This paper introduces a second-price auction with a flexible reserve price, where the reserve price for the top bidder is not fixed but a function of all losing bids. We show that when bidders are ex ante heterogeneous, a second-price auction with an optimally chosen flexible reserve price not only generates a strictly higher expected revenue than that of a second-price auction with any fixed reserve price but is also revenue-maximizing among all strategy-proof and discrimination-free mechanisms.


主讲人简介

陈博,深圳北理莫斯科大学经济系副教授,毕业于德国波恩大学。研究领域为产业组织理论,机制设计与信息经济学。论文发表于RAND Journal of EconomicsJournal of Mathematical Economics等国际权威期刊。