伟德BETVlCTOR1946学术系列活动之经济学系列Seminar第266期:邓林(澳门城市大学)

来源:伟德BETVlCTOR1946发布时间:2023-03-08浏览次数:93

主题Salary History Bans and Corporate Innovation

主讲人:邓林 澳门城市大学

主持人:李仲达 BETVLCTOR伟德官网下载

时间202339日(周四)15:00-16:30

地点:BETVLCTOR伟德官网下载石牌校区伟德BETVlCTOR1946(中惠楼)102

 

摘要

This paper finds that firms experience a decline in innovation performance following the adoption of salary history bans (SHBs) which prohibit employers from asking job candidates’ salary history in the hiring process. We hypothesize that SHBs provide job seekers with stronger bargaining power, thus imposing higher difficulties for employers to hire efficient inventors. Consistent with this hypothesis, first, we find that employee wages increase after SHBs. Second, we document that firms hire fewer and less efficient inventors. Third, we show that restrictions on unions’ strength neutralize the adverse effect of SHBs on innovation.

 

主讲人简介

邓林,澳门城市大学金融学助理教授,博士毕业于内布拉斯加大学林肯分校。研究领域为实证公司金融,包括公司创新,融资结构,融资成本等。现阶段工作论文的课题主要为研究股东权利及劳动力保护对公司运作的影响。

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